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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the influence of board size and board diversity on the performance of 
Community Development Financial Institutions’ operating in the Southeast. The results indicate that 
at present many CDFI boards are larger than optimal. The results also show that CDFIs generally 
have well diversified boards and that these organizations’ performance is unlikely to improve by 
further diversifying their boards. However, CDFis performance may be improved by promoting 
smaller boards.  
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PERFORMANCE AND GOVERNANCE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL 
INSITUTIONS:  
 BOARD SIZE AND DIVERSITY AS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Policies directed toward improving access to financial services by low-income people are 
more important than previously thought.  Recent studies find that this segment of the population 
benefits the most from development of financial institutions (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2004). Nationwide, however, low-income individuals and communities find it increasingly 
challenging to access financial services offered by conventional financial institutions, as these 
institutions streamline their operations to become more competitive in the global environment. Non-
traditional financial institutions, such as Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs), 
improve low-income individuals’ access to finance by providing affordable banking services and 
low-cost housing, by financing small businesses, and by offering community services that help 
stabilize neighborhoods and alleviate poverty.  
 
More than 1000 such organizations are currently active in the US and a survey of 442 of 
them shows that in 2002 these organizations held $10.2 billion in assets, provided $2.6 billion in 
financing to underserved individuals and communities, extended loans to over 7,800 businesses, and 
helped create and support over 34,000 jobs (2002 Industry Report available at www.cdfi.org). These 
numbers, although still very small, show that CDFIs expand the frontier of finance and offer 
services to the estimated 10 percent of the US households who do not even have a bank account 
(Quercia et al., 2002).  
 
While it is undoubtedly important to encourage lending to underserved individuals and 
communities, it is also important to understand what makes a well run CDFI. Policymakers will 
benefit from understanding what types of CDFIs are most likely to reach the largest number of 
clients in a profitable manner and what governance structures are most conducive to efficient use of 
scarce financial resources. Given that CDFIs measure returns in both financial and social terms, 
board members’ ability to steer the organization toward achieving the double bottom line of 
outreach and profitability will likely impact the success of the CDFI because the board plays a 
significant role in organizations with dual objectives (Holmstrom, 1999). 
 
This paper evaluates the influence of board size (measured by the number of board 
members) and board diversity (measured the proportion of women and minorities on the board) on 
the financial performance of Community Development Financial Institutions serving low-income 
individuals in the Southeast. The impact of board size and diversity on CDFI performance is 
estimated using an empirical model where performance (measured by return-on-assets or ROA) is 
modeled as a function of board size and diversity as well as key CDFI characteristics including size, 
age, and risk characteristics. The results indicate that the size of many CDFI boards is larger than 
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indicate that CDFIs have well diversified boards and that these organizations' performance is not 
affected by board diversity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: part two present the framework of analysis, part three 
presents the data and the empirical analysis and part four offers concluding remarks.  
 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
The concept of community development dates back to the 1800s, but the modern CDFI 
industry started to take shape in late 1960s and early 1970s. In the 1990s, the industry expanded 
dramatically with the creation of a government agency (CDFI Fund) with the authority to provide 
funding to individual CDFIs and their partners, and with the change in the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) that explicitly recognized loans and investments in CDFIs as a qualified 
CRA activity. Although the growing record of success inspires confidence in the industry and 
attracts additional lenders, little is known about these organizations’ performance and governance. 
Governance matters because bad governance practices weaken the organization, erode the value of 
loan portfolio and leave fewer funds available to lend to the poor. 
 
Governance refers to the mechanisms through which investors and other providers of funds 
ensure themselves that their funds will be used according to the intended purposes. [2] Such control 
mechanisms are necessary because managers and providers of funds may have diverging 
preferences and objectives. For example, CDFI managers may work towards fulfilling the outreach 
mission but they may also have preferences for non-pecuniary rewards. In the corporate governance 
literature, this problem is known as the agency problem. Agency costs, or costs incurred to align the 
interests of owners (principals) and managers (agents), exist and are not sub-optimal because it is 
not possible to have a world without the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Effective governance structure is needed to compensate for potential adverse results of 
asymmetric information between owners and CDFI managers. One such mechanism is the board of 
directors Fama and Jensen (1983a and b).   
 
Managers in CDFIs must consider the welfare of clients as well as the financial success of 
the institution, which means that managers need to perform several tasks. In multitask environments 
explicit and implicit incentive schemes such as compensation, perks etc., become less powerful, and 
less able to motivate managers. (Dewatripont et al. 1999a and 1999b).  Multiple tasks in 
organizations lead to a costly lack of focus and to “fuzzy missions”. Thus, standard mechanisms of 
control such as the labor market for managers and the market for takeovers are less efficient and the 
board of directors becomes the most important governance mechanism. Therefore, understanding 
what types of boards serve as the best mechanisms of control becomes even more important. 
 
The board of directors is an efficient mechanism of control and board member incentives are 
aligned with that of owners of capital because of the legal provision that the board can be held 
legally responsible for failing to perform effective monitoring. In addition board members offer their 
reputations as collateral to the public and will try to minimize their own risk of losing their 
reputations (Handy, 1995). Finally, peer policing decreases the incidence of inappropriate behavior 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a).  
 
A significant part of the empirical literature has focused on the impact of board size on 
organizational performance. The main idea put forward is that larger boards are less effective than 
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issue (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorch, 1992). This hypothesis is confirmed by studies of both large 
corporate boards and boards of small firms (Yermack, 1996; Eisenber, Sungren and Wells, 1998). 
Compared to other organizations, financial intermediaries have larger boards but still the impact of 
board size on financial intermediaries’ performance is the same—larger boards are less effective 
monitors (Adams and Mehran, 2003).  
 
Oster and Reagan (2004) studied the impact of board size in non-profit firms and put forward 
the hypothesis that in these organizations board size may need to be larger because of the additional 
duties of board members to supervise fundraising. However, these authors did not find evidence to 
support this hypothesis. On the contrary, they found that only personal charitable giving by board 
members increases with board size but an increase in board size reduces oversight and thus does not 
improve the productivity of the newly committed resources.  
 
Board diversity is another issue that has attracted attention. Traditionally, women and 
minorities have been underrepresented on corporate boards, especially in banking. Numerous 
proposals to improve board diversity have emerged. Two different reasons for improving board 
diversity are given. The first reason is the equity consideration—diversity should be promoted 
because it is fair to do so. The second reason given for promoting board diversity is that it may help 
shareholder wealth maximization (Brancato and Patterson, 1999).  
 
The second hypothesis, that board diversity improves firm performance and shareholder 
wealth, has empirical support (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Moreover, Carter, Simkins and Simpson 
(2003), exploring the performance of Fortune 100 companies, also found significant positive 
relationships between the fraction of women and minorities on the board and firm value. In addition, 
they found that the proportion of women and minorities on boards increases with firm size.  
 
For the case of non-profits, evidence shows that women directors spend more time on 
monitoring activities. However, since non-profit boards are very diverse better performing 
organizations do not have proportionally more women and minorities on the boards (Oster and 
O’Reagan, 2003). Exploring the impact of board size and composition in financial intermediaries is 
especially important because of the relatively limited research in this area (Macey and O’Hara, 
2003) 
 
Many authors have raised the issue of possible endogenity problems in the impact of board 
size and composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Empirical results have been mixed, with 
some indicating the presence of endogeneity and others its absence (Belkhir, 2004; Beiner, Drobetz 
Schmid and Ziommermann, 2004). Given that more of the CDFIs in the sample are relatively new, 
and thus still searching for the optimal board size, it is unlikely that endogenous bias will be 
substantial.  
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA 
 
The empirical analysis tests two hypothesis: (1) board size negatively affects CDFI 
performance and (2) board diversity positively impacts CDFI performance.  The empirical model 
estimated is  
 
Performance i =  1 α  +  1 β Board Size i  +  2 β Percentage of Women Directors i +  
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 + ∑ Controls 
=
m
j
j
1
β ij +  i ε     (1) 
where performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), the vector of controls includes capital 
structure (Equity to Total Assets Ratio), risk (Liability to Total Equity Ratio), CDFI age, CDFI size 
and organizational type and  i ε  is an error term. Performance is measured only in terms of financial 
results. Tirole (1999) reviews competing theories on whether measuring performance in more than 
one dimension (say profitability and outreach) is reasonable and concludes focus on profit 
maximization is still justified. This is consistent with theories on multiple tasks that suggest that 
performance should be measured in terms of best observed signal if the two tasks that managers are 
required to do are complementary. No difference is expected between different organizational types, 
and non-profits are increasingly operating like for-profit businesses (The Economist, January 29, 
2000). 
 
The data come form a survey conducted in 2002 by the CDFI Data Project and include all 
CDFIs operating in the Southeast Census region. A total of 71 organizations provided data on 
performance, capital structure, organizational type, risk, and board size but of them, only 57 
provided information on the percentage of women and minorities on the board. Equation (1) is first 
estimated using the smaller sample of 57 CDFIs. The sample of 71 CDFIs is also used to estimate a 
specification with the variables measuring board diversity (percentage of women directors and 
percentage of minority directors) excluded in order to establish whether the result on the impact of 
board size on CDFI performance can be successfully replicated with this sample.  
 
Summary statistics of the relevant variables are presented in Table 1. There is significant 
variation in all variables. For example, the average ROA for the sample is 3.77 percent but it varies 
from losses of 22.05 percent to gains of as much as 66.56 percent. CDFI size, measured in total 
assets, varies from $165,000 to $1 billion with a mean of $35.1 million and a standard deviation of 
$145 million. The average age of a CDFI is 25 years with a standard deviation of 23 years. CDFIs 
are well capitalized although not as well as other financial institutions. The mean of the equity-to-
total assets ratio is 24 percent and the standard deviation is quite large (29). This compares to the 
average financial intermediary capitalization in the range of 12 percent for banks. The measure of 
risk (liability-to-equity ratio) has a mean of 6.75 and a standard deviation of 6.31.  
 
Most of the CDFIs in the sample operate as cooperatives and this is specific for the 
Southeast because most of the CFDIs outside the region operate as non-profit entities. In the 
Southeast, 39 percent operate as non-profit units, while only 7 percent are for-profit firms, and the 
remaining 54 percent are cooperatives.  
 
In the sample, the smallest board consists of 4 members and the largest of 49.  The average 
board size is 11 members with standard deviation of 7. Unlike in other financial intermediaries, 
there is significant board diversity among board members. The average board has more than 50 
percent women (57.21) and more than two-thirds minorities (68.93). Only two organizations 
reported no women on the board and only 3 reported no minorities. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 2. The results indicate that board size 
influences performance while board diversity does not. Consistent with previous findings, larger 
boards are associated with worse financial results, thus indicating the presence of some free riding 
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improved by cutting the number of board members. Ceteris paribus, trimming the board size by one 
member is associated with an increase in ROA of .60 to .80 percentage points. 
 
Unlike previous studies that find some evidence for the impact of board diversity on firm 
performance, the results of this analysis indicate that diversity does not influence ROA. This result 
is not surprising because the CDFI boards are already well diversified given the significant presence 
of women and minorities on the boards. This larger representation of women and minorities is not 
associated with positive or negative impact, consistent with the study of Oster and Reagan (2004). 
Thus results suggest that, after a certain threshold of board diversity, a further increase in usually 
underrepresented groups does not have a significant impact. However, other characteristics, such as 
stakes in the organization or professional qualifications, may matter more.  
 
Estimation results reveal that the level of capitalization of CDFIs does not seem to influence 
performance. These findings illustrate that non-typical financial institutions can do as good a job in 
profitably serving the poor as highly leveraged financial intermediaries. The results also show that 
CDFIs who undertake higher risks as measured by the liability-to-equity ratio have worse 
performance.  
 
Surprisingly, the results show that older CDFIs have lower ROA. There seem to be no gains 
form experience in working with the poor, which may suggest that new lending technologies, which 
newer CDFIs presumably apply, are more profitable. In addition there seem to be no gains from firm 
size. On the contrary, smaller CDFIs do much better than larger CDFIs. These results may suggest 
that the smaller and newer firms are more suitable for addressing the need of the target population. 
  
The coefficients of organizational type dummies are not statistically significant in the ROA 
regression. Although it may be natural to expect that, due to regulatory and other constraints, boards 
in cooperatives may function differently than those in for-profits and/or non-profit organizational 
types, such an impact was not discovered.  
 
To draw conclusions about whether the coefficients estimated over one group of the data are 
equal to the coefficients estimated over another, a Chow test can be performed. If it indicates that 
the coefficient of the organizational type dummies (non-profit and cooperatives) and those of the 
interactive dummies (consisting of organizational type dummy multiplied by the board size) are not 
statistically different from zero, then the two groups should not be pooled together and the 
specification of the estimated model will be invalid. A Chow test revealed, however, that there is no 
difference in the influence of board size on ROA for different organizational types.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
CDFIs serve an important social function because they provide access to financial services to 
underserved low-income individual and families. Understanding what governance mechanisms 
promote the efficient use of scarce resources that these organizations possess matters because only 
sustainable institutions have the potential to change low-income individuals’ lives in the long-term. 
The focus of this paper was on evaluating the impact of board size and composition on the 
performance of CDFIs operating in the South.  The results show that CDFIs have well diversified 
boards and these organizations’ performance is unlikely to improve by further diversifying their 
boards. However, CDFis performance may be improved by promoting smaller boards.  
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Variable Mean  Std.  Min  Max 
Return on Assets (%)  3.77  12.14  -22.05  66.56 
Board size (number of members)  11  7  4  49 
CDFI age (years)  25  23  1  119 
CDFI size (total assets in $’000)  35,100 145,000  165  1,070,000
Log of total assets   15.1  1.9  12.0  20.8 
Equity to Total Assets Ratio (%)  24  29  -84  100 
Liability to Total Equity Ratio  6.75  6.31  -1.49  27.06 
Dummy variable for non-profit CDFI  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Dummy variable for cooperative CDFI  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Percent female board members  57.21  19.28  10  98 
Percent minority board members  68.93  29.90  0  100 
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 ROA
1 ROA
2
Constant 36.273  29.052* 
 (1.58)  (1.88) 
Board size   -0.795***  -0.604** 
 (4.54)  (2.28) 
Percent female board members  -0.062   
 (0.73)   
Percent minority board members  -0.053   
 (0.99)   
CDFI age   -0.483**  -0.430** 
 (2.42)  (2.49) 
CDFI age squared   0.005**  0.005** 
 (2.50)  (2.56) 
CDFI size(log of total assets)  -1.276  -1.561* 
 (1.28)  (1.87) 
Equity to Total Assets Ratio  0.020  0.067 
 (0.31)  (0.88) 
Liability to Total Equity Ratio  -0.363**  -0.341** 
 (2.20)  (2.65) 
Non-profit CDFI  13.293  13.921 
 (1.66)  (1.59) 
Cooperative CDFI  9.249  8.886 
 (1.07)  (0.99) 
    
Observations 57  71 
R-squared 0.48  0.40 
Prob>F 0.0001  0.01 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
The dependent variable is Return on Assets (ROA) 
1 Estimates of equation (1) using a sample of 57 observation containing a complete set of variables.  
2 Estimates of equation (1) using a sample of 71 observations without board diversity variables  
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  11ENDNOTES 
 
[1] The data for this study come from The CDFI Data Project Dataset (© 2004 CDFI Data Project) 
The author would like to thank Ms. Beth Lipson for her helpful comments on the data and the 
industry. 
 
[2] This definition is based on the definition by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) where corporate 
governance is defined as the mechanism through which shareholders (providers of funds) ensure 
themselves that they will receive maximum return on their investments 
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